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With the gestation and development of new technologies, new products, new formats, and new models, venture capital in-
vestment, as one of the most important forms of open innovation in large companies, plays an increasingly important role in the
innovation of mature large companies and entrepreneurial enterprises. To deal with the complex and dynamic environment, the
niche of Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) ecological community is investigated from the perspective of the innovation eco-
system. By analyzing the innovation of CVC ecological community with the use of the logistic expansion model, this paper
analyzes the stability of evolution game through the replicator dynamic equation and discusses ten parameters of niche state. In
the end, we conclude that there are four optimization strategies in the coevolution of major corporations and entrepreneurial
firms, namely, niche separation, niche expansion, niche K-R, and niche alliance.
1. Introduction
Innovation has become the endogenous driving force and
core competitive advantage of a country's economic growth.
In the complex and dynamic digital economy era, it is
difficult for enterprises to maintain traditional competition
barriers. To keep growing continuously, enterprises must
deal with issues such as the increasingly uncertain envi-
ronment, challenging value creation, and oversupply choices
for customers. +e traditional value chain creation model is
changing to the shared destiny community with a symbiosis
creation model. +erefore, large companies are constantly
seeking the path of open empowerment. Corporate Venture
Capital (CVC) has become an important model and tool for
open innovation, access to external technology sources, and
value creation. +e global venture capital funding in 2018
reached 254 billion US dollars, and the financing amount in
2017 was 174 billion RMB, of which the global company's
total venture capital investment was 312 billion US dollars.
Investment activities increased by 19% over 2016, and total
investment increased by 18% [1]. Companies in countries
like Britain, China, and India have hit record highs in their
venture capital. +e global CVC investment industry has
strong interests in areas with high technological innovation
and fierce competitions such as Internet, healthcare, and
mobile technology.
+e company’s venture capital originated in the United
States in the 1960s. It is now one of the main ways for mature
large companies to develop outwards. It has a strategic
appeal because it provides multiple choice platforms for
large companies to innovate. Corporate innovation requires
venture capital as a mechanism and driving force. Corporate
Venture Capital aims to achieve open innovation, obtain the
latest technology in related fields, and overcome the soft
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constraints of the company’s internal R&D budget so that
they can improve technology innovation efficiency. It could
also reduce the risk of investment in independent R&D and
improve organizational capabilities to foster an innovation
culture. It benefits the corporate by realizing the value of
strategic mergers and acquisitions and initiating entrepre-
neurial investment in strategic innovation projects. As
company’s venture capital has a high degree of risk tolerance
and a long investment cycle, it can invest in the startups that
are struggling to obtain traditional independent venture
capital (IVC). It promotes and optimizes mutual regener-
ation and achieves a better evolutionary cycle for both
parties. While mature companies deeply cultivate the Red
Sea, they must also actively explore in the Blue Ocean. CVC
is a hybrid model that stimulates innovation. It expands
industrial boundaries, rebuilds market boundaries, explores
cutting-edge technologies, encourages open innovation, and
expands organizational structures for large companies. It is
regarded as an effective paradigm to promote the evolution
of the industry ecosystem. It is also an important way for
large companies to acquire innovative technologies and
industrial integration [2]. CVC activities are a “dual and
two-way” value creation process that includes both strategic
and financial values, while creating value for mature large
companies and startups. With the advent of the digital
economy 2.0 era, ecological collaborative innovation models
have gradually taken shape. Typical digital economy com-
panies in China, such as Alibaba, Tencent, Xiaomi, and
Baidu, as well as traditional enterprises such as Haier and
Fosun, are actively building open innovation enterprise
ecosystems. +ey integrate the company’s own technology,
capital, and market advantages with external resources to
develop new technologies, new products, and new models
for new markets.
2. Related Work
Hannah and Eisenhardt proposed that, in addition to the
relationship between competition and cooperation, enter-
prises also need to continuously meet customer needs
through innovation [3]. Enterprises have evolved from the
role of an individual player in the industry into part of the
industrial ecosystem. Luo and Ratchford took Apple, IBM,
Ford, and Wal-Mart as examples to study focal companies
which develop service, technology, and value network
platforms to build their own unique business ecosystems and
obtain value returns [4]. Yao and Zhou used the theory of
natural ecosystem evolution to study the innovation path of
high-tech enterprises and found that the dependence of
enterprise innovation paths has ecological genetic and
variability characteristics [5]. Daniela et al. in “Evolutionary
+eory of Economic Change” explain economic changes
from a perspective of dynamic evolution. Evolutionary game
theory pays attention to the change of population structure
and uses evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) to represent a
stable state that can resist the invasion of mutation strategy
[6]. Levinthal proposed that corporate adaptation and en-
vironmental selection are the main paths of population
evolution [7]. Zaman et al. believe that internal and external
resources of an enterprise are equally important. Enterprises
use external resources and external channels to help com-
mercialize their new technological achievements. +ey also
emphasize that enterprises should quickly implement in-
novation, reduce innovation costs, and work with profes-
sional venture capital institutions to jointly improve
innovation performance [8].
One of the most challenging 125 scientific issues in the
21st century in science is, “how does cooperative behavior
evolve?” +e innovation ecosystem has the same charac-
teristics of natural evolution, integration, self-organization,
periodicity, and openness as natural ecosystems and shares
the same characteristics in power, genetics, evolution, and
feedback. Important scholars in the CVC field, Jog and
Mcconomy, creatively proposed that mature large compa-
nies have regarded CVC not only as the window for tech-
nology discovery but also as an ecosystem around large
companies [9].+is conclusion is based on previous research
on CVC enterprise value creation, CVC investment enter-
prise entrepreneurial performance, investment conditions,
and cross-organizational knowledge acquisition.Based on
the analysis of nearly 300 CVCs, Jog and Mcconomy pro-
posed that the increasing number of CVCs would contribute
in better short-term and long-term performance of the
ecosystem, which extends a previous view shared by scholars
that the CVC is only an incubator-level participant. Instead,
as an ecosystem strategy, CVC intends to “build a con-
stellation” [10]. +erefore, from the perspective of the
ecosystem and the niche theory, it is proposed that the CVC
ecological community, formed by mature large companies
and startups in the form of CVC projects, achieves syn-
chronization through interactions between CVC functions,
behavioral processes, and the external environment. In the
symbiotic mode, a symbiotic evolution can be developed
with the growth of large companies and entrepreneurial
enterprises.
3. CVC Niche for Major Corporations and
Entrepreneurial Firms
In 1838, the Dutch mathematical biologist Verhulst pro-
posed a logistic equation to study the growth of biological
populations. It was found that the population grew fastest at
the beginning. When it grew to a certain value, the speed
began to slow down until it finally decreased to zero (i.e.,
stop growing). In 1900, Italian mathematician Volterra
proposed the predator and prey populations model. In 1925,
Lotka proposed mathematical ecology in chemical reactions.
+en in 1926, Volterra used the Lotka–Volterra model to
demonstrate the rule of fish population in the port of Fiume.
Lotka–Volterra model, which evolved from the logistic
extended model, can better explain the relationship between
large companies and startups in the CVC ecological com-
munity. +is model, as an evolutionary game for species or
population formation, provides a new perspective to un-
derstand community structure optimization and niche
evolution [11].
+e growth of the corporate ecological community in-
volved in CVC also generally conforms to the mechanism of
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the logistic development; that is, the development of the
CVC ecological community is relatively immature: the
scale is not large; the growth space is large; and the de-
velopment speed is fast at S1. However, at this stage, for
large enterprises and startups, the initial capital investment,
human investment, and technical investment are relatively
large. +e symbiotic subjects of the CVC ecological
community are still in the running-in period with high
risks. At node P1, either CVC is offside to enhance the
niche, occupying a favorable position in the innovation and
entrepreneurship ecosystem, or it may gradually decline.
CVCs that operate smoothly, realize technological inno-
vation, and have shared and coordinated development can
successfully enter the second stage of the ecological niche
beyond P1. In the second stage of S2, the ecological niche of
CVC continued to expand; the benefits continued to in-
crease; innovation results and innovative technologies were
rapidly transformed; large companies achieved their stra-
tegic goals and financial goals; and startup companies also
achieved growth. At the second branch point P2, with great
innovation potential, the CVC ecological community,
formed by large companies with startups, integrates more
resources and continues to develop. +e symbiotic system
will rise to a higher stage, while the ecological shrinkage
may also occur. Figure 1 is the trend of CVC ecological
community evolution.
+erefore, the evolution of the niche also reflects the
characteristics of repeated games between large companies
and startups in the CVC ecological community. CVC ac-
tivities are also innovative activities. Large companies form
CVC ecological communities with startups through venture
capital for technological innovation. +ey aim to realize
value cultivation and value innovation and continuously
develop new competitive advantages in the industry com-
petition. By improving their own niche, they can achieve
their strategic goals and financial goals.
From the perspective of biology and evolutionary
games, the development of the CVC ecological community
is constrained by various factors such as talent, technology,
capital, and services, in specific time and space dimensions.
+e ecological factor domain Ci � f(z1, z2, z3, · · · , zn) is
used to represent the various factors z1, z2, z3, · · · , zn that
indicate the constraints for the development of the CVC
ecological community. +ere is a range value Ni of the
niche width Wi of ecological community i, which repre-
sents the competition coefficient αi of the CVC ecological
community. β represents the niche overlap value of the
CVC ecological community, and χi indicates the impact of
CVC investment strategies such as combination strategies,
capital injection strategies, exit methods, and space pref-
erences on the innovation of the CVC ecological
community.St represents the niche status (i) of the CVC
ecological community at time of t, and dS(t)/dt represents
the rate of change in the niche width for large enterprises
and entrepreneurial enterprises in the CVC ecology
community. Adjusted from the Lotka–Volterra model, the
niche evolution equations of the major corporations (MC)




� r1S1 ρ1 + χ1 − α1 − S1 − βS2( 􏼁,
dS2(t)
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Here, S1 and S2 represent the niche width limit of MC
and EF; ρ1 and ρ2 represent niche saturation coefficient of
MC and EF in the CVC ecological community; α1 and α2
represent competition coefficients: α1 is the competitive
effect of EF on MC, while α2 is the competitive effect of MC
on EF; and β represents niche overlap betweenMC and EF in
the CVC ecological community.
When β� 1, there is a complete niche overlap between
MC and EF.When β � 0, there is a complete niche separation
for MC and EF. If the value of β is between 0 and 1, there is
partial overlap between MC and EF. +e β is proportional to
α1 and α2, which means the bigger the overlap between MC
and EF, the more the fierce competition.
According to the above differences in β, the evolution of
the niche of large companies and startups in the CVC
ecological community is discussed as follows [12]:
(1) When β� 1, there is a complete niche overlap be-
tween MC and EF.
If dS1(t)/dt � 0
dS2(t)/dt � 0
􏼨 , the balanced position includes
H1(ρ1 + χ1 − α1, 0), H2(ρ2 + χ2 − α2, 0),H3(0, ρ1+
χ1 − α1), H4(0, ρ2 + χ2 − α2), O(0, 0).
+e equation for MC in the CVC ecological com-
munity is ρ1 + χ1 − α1 − S1 − S2 � 0.
+e equation for EF in the CVC ecological com-
munity is ρ2 + χ2 − α2 − S2 − S1 � 0.
As there is an equal slope, the position of the two
parallel straight lines L1, L2 depends on the values of
parameters ρ1 + χ1 − α1 and ρ2 + χ2 − α2.
When ρ1 + χ1 − α1 > ρ2 + χ2 − α2, we can obtain
Figure 2 in the following.
+e niche width of the MC in the CVC ecological
community is larger than the niche width of the EF.
P1
P2







Figure 1: +e trend of CVC ecological community evolution.
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MC completely includes the EF, indicating that the
MC occupies the entire niche space.
When ρ2 + χ2 − α2 > ρ1 + χ1 − α1, we can get Figure 3
in the following.
Entrepreneurial firm’s niche width (L2) in the CVC
ecological community is larger than that of major
corporation (L1). EF completely includes MC. +is
indicates that EF occupies the entire niche space.+e
result of evolution will also approach EF. +erefore,
when the MC and EF in the CVC ecological com-
munity completely overlap, the direction of the niche
evolution depends on the technologies, capital, hu-
man resources, and innovation resources used by the
MC and EF. +e one occupying the resource ad-
vantage will eventually control the evolution.
(2) When β� 0, there is a complete niche separation for
MC and EF.
If dS1(t)/dt � 0
dS2(t)/dt � 0
􏼨 , the balanced position includes
H1(ρ1 + χ1 − α1, ρ2 + χ2 − α2),
H2(ρ1 + χ1 − α1, 0),H3(0, ρ2 + χ2 − α2), O(0, 0).
+e equation for MC in the CVC ecological com-
munity is L1: S1 � ρ1 + χ1 − α1.
+e equation for EF in the CVC ecological com-
munity is L2: S2 � ρ2 + χ2 − α2.
We can obtain a separation as shown in Figure 4.
L1 andL2 divide four areas in the quadrant. In the
areas below L1 (dS1(t)/dt< 0), the evolution direc-
tion rises, while in the areas above L1 (dS1(t)/dt> 0),
the evolution direction goes downward. In the areas
on the left of L2 (dS2(t)/dt< 0), the evolution di-
rection goes right, while in the areas on the right of
L2(dS2(t)/dt> 0), the evolution direction goes left.
In quadrant 1, dS1(t)/dt> 0 and dS2(t)/dt < 0.
In quadrant 2, dS1(t)/dt> 0 and dS2(t)/dt > 0.
In quadrant 3, dS1(t)/dt< 0 and dS2(t)/dt < 0.
In quadrant 4, dS1(t)/dt< 0 and dS2(t)/dt > 0.
+erefore, we can conclude that the result of evo-
lution tends to equilibrium H1(ρ1 + χ1 − α1, ρ2+
χ2 − α2), where the large companies and startups in
the CVC ecological community occupy their re-
spective niche. Its niche size is related to the niche
saturation coefficients ρi of both parties, the com-
petition coefficient αi of large enterprises and
startups in the CVC ecosystem, and the impact
coefficient χi of CVC ecological community inno-
vation CVC investment strategy (CVC portfolio
strategy, CVC investment stage strategy, CVC exit
method, CVC investment space preference).
(3) When 0< β< 1, MC and EF niche partially overlap.
+e evolution path depends on the ecological do-
main space of their respective resources.
If dS1(t)/dt � 0
dS2(t)/dt � 0
􏼨 , the balanced position includes
O(0, 0), H1(ρ1 + χ1 − α1, 0),
H2(0, ρ1 + χ1 − α1/β),H3(ρ2 + χ2 − α2/β, 0), and
H4(0, ρ2 + χ2 − α2):
G
ρ1 + χ1 − α1 − β ρ2 + χ2 − α2( 􏼁
1 − β2
,




As the values of the parameters are different, the ana-
lytical expressions have different evolution trends. +ere are
four competition situations between the two populations:
Situation 1. When (ρ1 + χ1 − α1/β)> ρ2 + χ2 − α2 and
(ρ2 + χ2 − α2/β)< ρ1 + χ1 − α1.
In the area surrounded by the quads H1, H2, H3, H4
(Figure 5), where dS1(t)/dt< 0¸ dS2(t)/dt > 0, large com-
panies have not reached the maximum capacity for growth;
i.e., there is still room for growth and development. While,
startups have reached the maximum capacity; i.e., there is
little room for continued growth. Large companies have
mastered related technological innovations. +e corre-
sponding evolution is shown in Figure 5.
Situation 2. When (ρ1 + χ1 − α1/β)< ρ2 + χ2 − α2 and
(ρ2 + χ2 − α2/β)> ρ1 + χ1 − α1.
In the area surrounded by the quads H1, H2, H3, H4
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Figure 6: Startups occupy the ecological domain of large companies.
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entrepreneurial enterprises in the CVC ecosystem can
continue to develop, but large companies have reached their
limits. +erefore, entrepreneurial enterprises can invade
some ecological domains for large companies, as shown in
Figure 6.
Situation 3. When (ρ2 + χ2 − α2/β)> ρ1 + χ1 − α1 and
(ρ1 + χ1 − α1/β)> ρ2 + χ2 − α2
L1and L2 come across at point G, as shown in Figure 7.
G
ρ1 + χ1 − α1 − β ρ2 + χ2 − α2( 􏼁
1 − β2
,




In the area of H2GH4, there is still room for growth of
startups, while large companies have developed to the
maximum capacity, approaching G. In the GH1H3 region,
large companies continue to grow, while the growth of
startups has reached the upper limit. +e movement trends
of both parties will gradually approach point G, where G is
the equilibrium point for the coexistence of large enterprises
and entrepreneurial enterprises in the CVC ecological
community.
Situation 4. When (ρ2 + χ2 − α2/β)< ρ1 + χ1 − α1 and
(ρ1 + χ1 − α1/β)< ρ2 + χ2 − α2.
L1 andL2 come across at point P, as shown in Figure 8.
In the H2PH4 andH1PH3 areas, both large companies and
startups have room for continued innovation and growth. Both
sides may have the opportunity to win in the competition
process, so they have not reached an equilibrium state. +e
niche occupation depends on what the two parties have in the
initial ecological domain. +e larger the initial ecological do-
main is, the more resources it possesses, and the easier it is to
win in the CVC ecological community. +is also makes CVC
ultimately achieve the strategic goals and financial goals of large
companies by IPO, mergers, and acquisitions. While startups
get mature, big companies can quit.
In the above analysis, situations (1), (2), and (4) are all
unbalanced and stable. In the balanced state (3), large en-
terprises and startups in the CVC ecosystem can coexist and
maximize their own added value.
4. Construction of the Evolutionary Game
Model for the CVC Ecological
Community Innovation
Evolutionary game theory exists in Darwin’s idea of natural
selection. Based on the dual theory of game theory and
biological evolution, this section analyzes the formation
mechanism of interaction between populations in ecological
communities and studies population growth, evolution, and
stability [13].
4.1. Evolutionary Game Analysis. +e symbiotic evolution
between large companies and startups in the CVC ecological
community will increase the adaptability of both parties and
thus their respective niche. +e evolutionary game theory
has been used to analyze the operating mechanism of large
companies and startups. Here we use evolution stability
strategy to analyze the evolution path of CVC ecological
community. +e strategy adjustment process, trends, and
stability of large players and startups in priority game players
are considered. ESS evolutionary stability strategy and
Taylor and Jonker’s replicator dynamic equations are used as
well [14]. +e niche evolution process of CVC ecological
community innovation also requires mutation and selection
mechanisms [15]. +e formation and development of the
CVC eco-community is the game behavior between large
companies, startups, and other related entities. Its formation
and development are also the result of the dynamic evolution
of multiparty games. When there is a two-way causal re-
lationship between a large company and a startup company
under a certain feedback mechanism, the adaptive change of
the large company will change the adaptability of the startup
company, while the change of the startup company will
further affect the change of the large company. By assessing
their participation in CVC investment activities, the two
parties will promote the continuous evolution of the CVC
ecological community when the results of multiple rounds of
game play with other entities are greater than their
nonparticipation.
4.2. Research Hypothesis and Model Building
4.2.1. Research Hypothesis. +e changes in the niche of large
companies and startups in the CVC ecosystem are affected
by a variety of ecological factors in the symbiotic envi-
ronment of venture capital. At the same time, the strategy
obtained by the opponent based on the irrational selection is
an important factor. Entrepreneurial enterprises will play
dynamic games. First, assuming that the strategy set of MC is
niche maintenance and niche expansion, the strategy set of
an entrepreneurial company can be participation in com-
petition and acceptance. In this case, there is a two-stage
game in the CVC investment activity process. +is can be
regarded as an evolutionary game of dual population and
dual strategy [16]. Second, assuming that both large com-
panies and startups are bounded in rationality, they choose
the best strategy based on their own situation and envi-
ronment. +ird, in the CVC ecological community, large
companies, and startups make strategic adjustments based
on their strategy and the external environment. A repeated
game would happen as the adjustment also depends on the
choices and the performance of these companies.
4.2.2. Construction of Fitness Function Matrix. Assuming
that the niche separation of large companies and startups
does not affect them, the two types of corporate populations
in their own ecological space and time have the benefits of
independent innovation R1 and R2. When the MC pop-
ulation chooses to expand its niche through CVC activities,
it can realize innovation benefits, including the benefits
created by knowledge sharing as a result of sharing various
resources and technology spillovers. It can be represented by
λ(a + b)Δr, where λ is the absorptive capacity coefficient of
the large company population; a and b are the knowledge
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sharing coefficient and the technology spillover coefficient,
respectively; and Δr is unit excesses benefit. If the MC ex-
pands, the EF also carries out the niche expansion, which can
achieve excess returns. Both parties need to pay a certain cost
during the niche expansion process. +e cost paid by the
large company can be expressed as C1, and the cost paid by
startup company is represented by C2. +ere are also large
companies that expand their niche, and startups choose to
keep the same niche. In this case, they can get a profit e. +e
probability that a large company will expand its niche is p,
and the probability of maintaining it is 1 − p. +e probability
of participating in competition based on feedback from
startups is q, and the probability of maintaining the original
ecology is 1 − q. +e game fitness payment matrix is
established in Table 1.
4.3. Evolution Path Analysis
4.3.1. Replicator Dynamic Equation Solving. According to
the game fitness function matrix above, it can be concluded
that, for theMC, which chooses to expand the niche, that is, to
carry out CVC investment activities, the expected return is
U11 � q R1 + λ(a + b)Δr − C1( 􏼁 +(1 − q) R1 − C1( 􏼁
� R1 + qλ(a + b)Δr − C1,
U12 � q R1 + e( 􏼁 +(1 − q)R1 � qe + R1,
U1 � pU11 +(1 − p)U12
� p qλ(a + b)Δr − qe − C1( 􏼁 + qe + R1.
(4)
In the same way, for the EF, the expected income and
expansion of the niche expansion are U21 and U22, while the
average expectation of the startup enterprise is U2:
U21 � p R2 +[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2􏼂 􏼃 +(1 − p), R2 − C2( 􏼁
� R2 + p[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2,
U22 � p R2 + e( 􏼁 +(1 − p)R2 � e + R2,
U2 � qU21 +(1 − q)U22,
� q R2 + p[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2􏼂 􏼃 +(1 − q) pe + R2􏼂 􏼃
� q p[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − pe − C2􏼂 􏼃 + pe + R2.
(5)
According to the replicator dynamic formula of the
evolutionary game, the replicator dynamic equations of large
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Figure 8: Large companies and startups continue to grow and cannot reach balance.
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� q U22 − U2( 􏼁
� q(1 − q) p[[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e] − C2􏼈 􏼉.
(6)
4.3.2. Evolutionary Stability Strategies for MC. According to




� p U11 − U1( 􏼁
� p(1 − p) q(λ(a + b)Δr − e) − C1􏼂 􏼃.
(7)
+ree stable points of the equation can be obtained,
namely, p∗1 � 0, p
∗
2 � 1, and p
∗
3 � C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e. If an
evolutionary stable strategy is required, the derivative dy-




� (1 − 2p) q(λ(a + b)Δr − e) − C1􏼂 􏼃. (8)
When q>C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e, we get p∗2 � 1, an evolu-
tionary expansion strategy, which means MC will choose
niche expansion strategy. When q<C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e, we
get p∗1 � 0, an evolutionary stability strategy, which means
MC will choose strategies to maintain their original niche.
When q � C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e, dp/dt equals zero, which is
always a stable status.
4.3.3. Evolutionary Stability Strategies for EF. According to




� q U22 − U2( 􏼁
� q(1 − q) p[[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e] − C2􏼈 􏼉.
(9)
+ree stable points of the equation can be obtained,
namely, q∗1 � 0, q
∗
2 � 1, and q
∗
3 � C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e.
When p � C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e, we get dq/dt � 0,
with q being in stable status. When p>C2/[1 − λ(a+
b)]Δr − e, we get dq/dt< 0, which is an evolutionary ex-
pansion strategy. EF also chooses to expand its niche to enter
MC’s related industries. When p<C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e,
we get q∗1 � 0, which is an evolutionary stable strategy. EF
maintains its original niche.
+e above discussion does not consider the relationship
and size of the parameters. When the combination of pa-
rameters changes, the game strategy of large enterprises and
entrepreneurial enterprises in the CVC ecological com-
munity changes.
4.3.4. Impact of Parameter Changes on Evolutionary Game
Strategies. +e first topic is about the effect of parameter
changes on the evolutionary stability strategy of MC:
(1) For 0<C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e< 1, evolutionary stable
equilibrium is determined by two situations of q.
When q>C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e, we get p∗2 � 1, an
evolutionary expansion strategy (EES), while when
q<C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e, we get p∗1 � 0, an evolution-
ary stable strategy (ESS).
(2) For C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e≥ 1, we always get
q<C1/λ(a + b)Δr − e, and p∗1 � 0, which is ESS.+at
is, the cost of niche expansion is high, and large
companies maintain their original niche.
+e second topic is about the impact of changes in
parameters on the evolutionary stability strategy of EF:
(1) For 0<C2/1 − λ(a + b)Δr − e< 1, there are two
possibilities. When p>C2/1 − λ(a + b)Δr − e, we get
q∗2 � 1, an EES. When p<C2/1 − λ(a + b)Δr − e, we
get q∗1 � 0, an ESS.
(2) For C2/1 − λ(a + b)Δr − e≥ 1, we always get p<C2/
1 − λ(a + b)Δr − e, q∗1 � 0, which is an ESS.
By a comprehensive analysis of the stability strategies of
the two sides of the game analyzed above, we get five balance
points, namely, O(0, 0), P(1, 0), Q(0, 1), R(1, 1) � E(C1/
λ(a + b)Δr − e, C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e).
4.4. Game Process with Niche Parameters
4.4.1. Evolution Strategy of MC in the CVC Ecological
Community. When considering the status and momentum
of large companies and startups in the CVC ecosystem, that
is, the growth of large companies’ innovation efforts and
potential innovation capabilities, the fitness function needs
to consider the status value of the large company population
(T1) and potential value (S1). +e game player’s entrepre-
neurial state value is T2, and the potential value is S2. +e
higher the values of T1, S1, T2, and S2, the stronger the
ability to obtain innovative resources and the stronger the
ability to expand the niche.+ematrix above can be adjusted
to Table 2.
+e corresponding income formula is as follows:
U11 � q R1 + λ(a + b))Δr − C1( 􏼁 +(1 − q) R1 − C1( 􏼁,
U12 � q R1 + e + T1S1( 􏼁 +(1 − q)R1 � q e + T1S1( 􏼁 + R1,
U1 � pU11 +(1 − p)U12
� p qλ(a + b)Δr − q e + T1S1( 􏼁 − C1( 􏼁 + q e + T1S1( 􏼁 + R1.
(10)




� p U11 − U1( 􏼁
� p(1 − p) q λ(a + b)Δr − e + T1S1( 􏼁 − C1􏼂 􏼃.
(11)
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For F(p) � 0, the stable points are q∗1 � 0, q
∗
2 � 1, and
q∗3 � C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − (e + T1S1):
(1) When q � C1/λ(a + b)Δr − (e + T1S1), dp/dt equals
zero, and the value of p is stable
(2) When q>C1/λ(a + b)Δr − (e + T1S1), d2p/d2t< 0,
we obtain p∗2 � 1, an EES
(3) When q<C1/λ(a + b)Δr − (e + T1S1), d2p/d2t> 0,
we obtain p∗1 � 0, an ESS
4.4.2. Evolutionary Strategies of EF. +e corresponding
income formula is as follows:
U21 � p R2 +[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2􏼂 􏼃 +(1 − p) R2 − C2( 􏼁
� R2 + p[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2,
U22 � p R2 + e + T2S2( 􏼁 +(1 − p)R2 � p e + T2S2( 􏼁 + R2,
U2 � qU21 +(1 − q)U22
� q R2 + p[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2􏼂 􏼃
+(1 − q) p e + T2S2( 􏼁 + R2􏼂 􏼃
� q p[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − p e + T2S2( 􏼁 − C2􏼂 􏼃
+ p e + T2S2( 􏼁 + R2.
(12)




� q U22 − U2( 􏼁
� q(1 − q) p [1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e + T2S2( 􏼁􏼂 􏼃 − C2􏼈 􏼉.
(13)
For F(q) � 0, the stable points are q∗1 � 0, q
∗
2 � 1, and
q∗3 � C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − (e + T2S2):
(1) When p � C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − (e + T2S2), any
value of q is an ESS
(2) When p>C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − (e + T2S2), we get
q∗2 � 1, an ESS
(3) When p<C2/[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − (e + T2S2), we get
q∗1 � 0, an ESS
4.4.3. Coevolution Strategy of MC and EF in the CVC Eco-
logical Community. By unifying the above various game
results into a coordinate quadrant, we get comprehensive
game process of large companies and startups in CVC
ecological community in Figure 9.
It can be seen from the figure that, in the regional QOPE,
the evolutionary stability strategy of large companies and
startups is (0,0); that is, neither party adopts the strategy of
niche expansion in CVC activities. +e evolutionary and
stable strategies of both enterprises and startups are (1,1),
which means that both large companies and startups are
actively expanding their niche. However, the strategic ac-
tions of large enterprises and startups depend on the po-
sition of E. +rough discussing the position of E, the factors





× 1 × Ex +
1
2
× 1 × Ey �
1
2





λ(a + b)Δr − e + T1S1( 􏼁
+
C2
[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e + T2S2( 􏼁
􏼢 􏼣.
(14)
As long as the probability of more actions taken by large
companies and startups on both sides of the game is within
SQOPE, both parties choose not to expand the niche. At this
time, the evolution direction depends on SQOPE and SQRPE.
When SQOPE> SQRPE, the evolution converges to point O.
When SQOPE< SQRPE, the evolution converges to point B.
When SQOPE � SQRPE, the probability of the two sides
converging toward O or R is equal.
4.5. Evolution Strategy of CVC Ecological Community.
+rough the above analysis, 10 parameters that influence the
direction of evolution are obtained. +e common evolution
path is discussed separately for each parameter by seeking
partial derivatives:

















[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr e + T2S2( 􏼁
> 0.
(15)
+is shows that SQOPE is a monotonically increasing
function for C1, C2. For MC and EF, the higher the
cost of forming a CVC ecological community is, the
more it tends to maintain the original niche.
















Since a is not monotonic for SQOPE, a second-order
derivative is performed:







Expanding R1 + λ(a + b)Δr − C1 R1 − C1
R2 + [1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − C2 R2 + e + T2S2
Maintaining R1 + e + T1S1 R1










λ(a + b)Δr − e + T1S1( 􏼁􏼂 􏼃
3 > 0.
(17)



















λ(a + b)Δr − e + T1S1( 􏼁􏼂 􏼃
2.
(19)
At this time, the stable strategy of MC and EF is (1,1).
Both of them implement niche expansion strategies.
+e parameter b is derived from the above a.































[1 − λ(a + b)]Δr − e + T2S2( 􏼁􏼂 􏼃
2 > 0.
(20)
SQOPE is a monotonically increasing function of T1,
S1,T2, and S2, indicating that the larger the state and
potential of the niche of large companies and
startups in the CVC ecosystem (that is, the tech-
nology, talents, capital, and social resources of large
companies and startups), the better the foundation,
and the greater the real dominance and influence
that large companies and startups have on the in-
novation environment. It is more likely that two
sides tend to maintain their original niche.
















It shows that SAECO is a monotonically increasing
function of e, which means that the greater the in-
novation income from maintaining the original
niche is, the more likely the large enterprises and
startups tend to maintain the original niche.






(1 − λ(a + b))C2









SQOPE is a monotonic reduction function for Δr; that
is, the larger the excess returns, the larger the result
of the game between the large enterprise and the
entrepreneurial enterprise. Both parties choose to
expand the niche strategy.




















Figure 9: Comprehensive game process of large companies and startups in CVC ecological community after comprehensive situational
factors.
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SQOPE is a monotonic reduction function for Δr; that is,
the larger the excess returns, the larger the result of the game
between the MC and the EF. Both parties choose to expand
niche strategy.
5. Optimization Strategy for CVC Niche
Evolution in Ecological Community
+e evolution of the ecological niche of the CVC ecological
community is subject to the combined effects of multiple
mechanisms, and competition and symbiosis are affected by
interest-driven and ecological balance. +e benefit-driven
mechanism is the inherent growth mechanism of the CVC
ecological community under a certain environment of in-
novation and entrepreneurship. +e source of motivation is
the maximum pursuit of individual interests by large en-
terprises and entrepreneurial enterprises. Large enterprise
populations and entrepreneurial enterprise populations
integrate related resources through horizontal symbiosis,
vertical symbiosis, or dynamic alliances to eliminate or
reduce resource bottlenecks and promote the smooth de-
velopment of large enterprises and individual entrepre-
neurial enterprises. +erefore, the CVC ecological
community, as a core part of the innovation and entre-
preneurship ecosystem, presents a nonlinear and expo-
nential growth trend. As a self-protection mechanism of the
ecological niche of the CVC ecological community, the
ecological balance mechanism can ensure the self-sustain-
ment and steady evolution of the CVC niche. In addition to
the innovation, entrepreneurship, and ecological resources,
the growth of the population is affected by material, energy,
and information accumulation but is also balanced and
stabilized by self-organization and self-regulation because of
environmental factors.
+e CVC ecological niche represents the status of the
CVC ecological community with large companies and
startups as the core to own and control human resources,
technical resources, capital, and other social resources, as
well as the adaptability to the innovative ecological envi-
ronment and the comprehensive use of various resources.
+e healthy growth of CVC ecological communities requires
specific analysis of internal and external environmental
ecological factors, including limiting factors and interest
factors. +e limiting factor is the bottleneck that restricts the
development of the CVC ecological community. Both the
large enterprise population and the entrepreneurial enter-
prise population focus on easing the constraint of the
limiting factor to enhance the evolution capacity of the
entire CVC ecological community. At the same time, the
CVC ecological community also has benefit factors as its
driving force for development.+e enhanced interest factors
of core populations can enable their respective niche evo-
lution to achieve sustainable competitiveness and become an
irreproducible and far-reaching advantage through the
formation of core competitiveness. +e large enterprise
population and entrepreneurial enterprise population in the
CVC ecological community are usually in different positions
in the value chain. +erefore, the CVC ecological com-
munity should make full use of the symbiotic resources on
the value chain, unblock the symbiotic channels, or form
strategic alliances or virtual industries to achieve coevolution
for the niche. +e large enterprise population and the en-
trepreneurial enterprise population within the CVC eco-
logical community implement corresponding niche
separation strategies, niche expansion strategies, niche K-R
strategies, and niche alliance strategies.
5.1. CVC Niche Separation Strategy. If the niche overlap
between large enterprises and startups in the CVC eco-
logical community indicates that there is a certain in-
dustry correlation between large companies and startups,
the competition is fierce when the niche overlaps between
the two. In order to obtain more living space, the two sides
can implement niche separation strategy. Large enter-
prises and startups can find the most suitable position for
their own development through CVC activities. +e core
of niche separation is to (a) use and integrate innovation
and entrepreneurial resources, (b) choose a combination
of ecological factors that are different from those of
competitors, (c) have a stronger advantage at a certain
position of talent, technology, capital, and social resource
gradients, and (d) achieve heterogeneity and symmetry.
Whether it is a mature large enterprise or a startup en-
terprise, it can choose two different niche separation
strategies: specialization strategy and generalization
strategy. +e specialization strategy is for narrow-niche
enterprises, which can provide a small range of products
and services with characteristics to form an agglomeration
strategy to concentrate the various resources of species in
a limited ecological space, that is, to focus on a certain step
in the value chain, so that the niche overlap with other
species is reduced. +e generalized strategy is similar to
the no-difference strategy for relatively wide niche
companies, and the risks are relatively small.
In the CVC ecological community, whether large
companies and startups choose specialization or general-
ization strategies is related to the richness of resources they
can use. Generalization strategies can provide more survival
for large companies with strong competitiveness. However,
early stage startups, which have limted resources while still
implementing generalisation strategies, would easily fail or
be acquired by large companies. . +erefore, for startup
companies, specialization strategies are more conducive to
maintaining their own niche and reducing the ecology
overlap with large enterprises, to reduce competition.
Startups in the CVC eco-community can also consider
adopting a niche separation strategy from the time, space,
and target market dimensions.
Complexity 11
5.2. CVC Niche Expansion Strategy. +e investment of
mature large enterprises in startup enterprises through CVC
activities is a niche expansion strategy. It uses open-ended
innovation through venture capital to open up new resource
spaces, acquire innovative technologies, and thus achieve the
purpose of expanding the niche. +ey aim to alleviate the
competitive pressure brought by overlapping niche. For
large enterprises, the introduction of new and efficient
ecological elements is their original intention when choosing
CVC. It is also an effective means of exploring and devel-
oping suitable options for their own development so that
they can acquire financial benefits. +e introduction of new
ecological elements can improve the utilization of various
resources in the innovation and entrepreneurship ecosys-
tem. Due to the obvious industry attributes of CVC and the
high degree of innovation in the high-tech industry, the
technology has a high rate of change; i.e., products and
technologies will be updated faster. +e uncertainty of in-
dependent research and development is high, so large en-
terprises need to expand their niche through CVC. For large
enterprises and startups with weak innovation ability, weak
interorganizational learning ability, and low absorptive
capacity and involvement, especially for large companies, it
is worthwhile to raise the basic niche or explore potential
niche through CVC activities [17].
5.3. CVCNicheK-R Strategy. Ray proposed a niche selection
strategy. +e K strategy indicates that, by increasing com-
petitiveness, improving resource utilization efficiency, and
increasing the environmental capacity of species in a stable
environment, a higher saturation density can be achieved.
+e R strategy means that, by breeding in large numbers,
new offspring can be adapted to the unstable environment,
thereby identifying its own niche [18].
+e choice of K strategy will be limited by the envi-
ronment. When the niche develops to a certain degree, it will
reach the limit of affordability. In the CVC ecological
community, the development of large enterprise populations
also follows the KR strategy. +e large enterprise population
of the K strategy is characterized by a low reproduction rate
and slow growth, but it can achieve strategic goals through
CVC and continuously adapt to new environmental
changes. It has unique core competitiveness in related in-
dustries. Its products and services are not easily copied and
imitated. When large enterprises become the leading
companies in an industry, environmental resources will be
the biggest obstacle to their development [19]. +e startups
of R strategy are usually small in size, are not constrained by
the environment, and have a fast reproduction capacity.
When they grow to a certain degree, the growth rate also
starts to decline.
+e CVC ecological community uses the R strategy and
the K strategy, respectively. +e abscissa indicates the size of
niche space occupied by the large enterprises and startups in
the ecological community at time t, while the ordinate
represents the size of the niche space occupied by species at
time t+ 1. +e dotted line indicates that the size of the niche
space has not changed (Nt+1/Nt � 1). +e part above the
dotted line indicates that the ecology of large enterprises or
startups has become larger; that is, Nt+1 >Nt. +e curve
below the dotted line indicates that the niche space has
become smaller; that is Nt+1 <Nt (Figure 10).
+ere are two intersections between the growth curve
and the dotted line for K strategy. X is an unstable equi-
librium point [20]. +ere may be two situations for large
enterprises or startups at point X. First, when the CVC
ecological community survives, there are large niche spaces
that have not been occupied yet. Companies using K strategy
to grow rapidly. Second, the overall space of the CVC
ecological community has continued to shrink during the
recession period, until the K strategy companies die out.
When it is at a stable point, it indicates the maximum ca-
pacity of the ecosystem space and the maximum market
capacity of technology, talent, capital, social resources, etc.
When the K strategy prevents the individual from falling
below stability, the scale is expanded to achieve stability.
When the K strategy enterprise is above the stability point,
its downsizing resumes [21].+e sustainable development of
the CVC eco-community can be achieved if the large en-
terprise population and the entrepreneurial enterprise
population in the CVC eco-community can adjust the niche
countermeasures in a timely and accurate manner at dif-
ferent stages in the development process.
5.4. CVC Niche Alliance Strategy. In the CVC ecological
community, large companies and startups can expand their
niche by establishing a mutually beneficial symbiotic
relationship. +is strategy is called the niche alliance
strategy. When the weaker startups and the stronger large
companies can improve their respective competitiveness
through symbiotic relationships, symbiotic parties in the
CVC ecosystem can either choose their own appropriate
niche or expand the boundaries of the entire ecological
community from the perspective of enhancing the sym-
biotic system, promoting the metabolism of the entire
CVC ecological community based on innovation. If the
implementation of the niche alliance strategy requires the
evaluation of their respective niche, the niche overlap and
market crossover of both sides should be minimized to
avoid parasitic or favorable symbiosis and form conflicts
of interest [22]. Large enterprises and startups can seek
intersections, that is, new requirements between the two
sides. +ey can use the positive feedback effect of the
innovation and entrepreneurship environment to create
higher-level niche that is beneficial to both sides and can
realize the coevolution of the niche. +e main motivation
of CVC activities is that large enterprises need to seek
technological progress. Entrepreneurs in small and me-
dium habitats in the industry can obtain more coopera-
tion resources through the form of CVC, so that they can
expand their survival through cooperative technological
innovation, management innovation, and differentiated
service innovation. In this case, they can expand the width
of the niche and then penetrate or embed other industries.
+e formation and evolution of large enterprises and
entrepreneurial enterprises in the CVC ecological
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community will also generate greater benefits in their own
or other fields.
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